Market Monitor: Development of the Wholesale Electricity Market in 2006 by Maria de Kleijn et al.
 
 
Market Monitor: Development of the 






















The Netherlands Competition Authority - Office of Energy Regulation 
 
The Hague, December 2007 
 
 






Willem van den Reek 
Gijs Thomeer 
Maria de Kleijn   2
                                                          
Summary 
 
Competition in the Dutch electricity market is stagnating. The market remains concentrated, with relatively 
high prices. The north-west European market must be further integrated by expanding the available 
interconnection capacity in order to achieve a structural improvement. That could cut consumers’ annual 
energy bills by several dozen euros per household. Consumers would also benefit indirectly since electricity 
prices for business would also fall, putting downward pressure on prices of other products. In order to 
achieve these benefits for consumers, the TSO’s must make headway with the expansion of the available 
interconnection capacity. 
 
The high degree of concentration in the electricity market in the Netherlands remains a point of concern. A 
result of the high concentration is that in many hours one or more players are pivotal in meeting demand. 
They are not necessarily always the same players. Such pivotality enables players to increase prices.  
 
The high degree of concentration and the regular pivotality of one or more players have an impact on market 
outcomes. Our statistical analysis of the Monitor data confirms the conclusion recently reached by the 
European Commission in its recent “sector enquiry” that a positive link exists between the degree of 
pivotality and the profitability of electricity production
1: the greater the pivotality, the more the electricity price 
differs from the underlying costs of production. 
 
The pivotality of certain players is greatest in the hours when demand is high: the peak and super-peak 
hours
2. In the peak hours, the electricity price was on average 9% higher than the marginal costs of the most 
expensive plant in operation, and during super-peak hours it was as much as 21% higher. Although some 
plants realise negative profits during off-peak hours, the average annual gross profit is more than sufficient to 
cover the annual costs of new investments. 
 
Stagnating trend in liquidity due to limited integration with neighbouring countries  
The liquidity of the Dutch wholesale market hardly improved at all in 2006. The Netherlands still scores 
poorly in comparison with other countries: the Netherlands had more price peaks (APX) and a widening bid-
offer spread (OTC). The APX has higher prices than the foreign exchanges EEX and Powernext. Prices of 
forward contracts in the Dutch OTC market in 2006 were also higher than in Germany and France. The 
relatively high prices are due to the large proportion of relatively expensive gas-fired plants used in electricity 
production, combined with congestion at the borders and limited domestic competition. The differences 
observed in comparison with neighbouring countries mean international convergence in liquidity is still far 
from being achieved.  
 
Market integration impeded by limited cross-border connections  
As a result of congestion in the cross-border connections, players in the Dutch wholesale market are only 
disciplined to a limited extent by foreign supplies and market development continues to be determined by the 
Dutch situation. As a result, Dutch prices remain relatively high. The congestion is caused partly by the 
limited physical capacity and partly by suboptimal capacity allocation, as a result of which capacity is not 
always optimally utilised.  
 
 
1 To be precise: between the degree of pivotality and the gross margin of the price-setting plant.  
2 Peak hours are the hours from 7am to 11pm and super-peak hours are the hours from 9am to 6pm, in both cases on weekdays.   3
                                                          
Market integration is further limited by the fact that international trade is not yet fully developed. There are 
still no possibilities for trading electricity across borders on the delivery date, because transmission capacity 
is then no longer available. Consequently, no coupling is yet possible between the imbalance markets and the 
very short-term markets in the various countries in the region.  
 
North-west European integration is crucial for the Dutch market  
There are clear benefits of scale in electricity production: with a larger production portfolio, risks can be better 
controlled and covered, plant utilisation can be better optimised, operating costs can be reduced and crucial 
knowledge can be retained more effectively. These scale benefits can be achieved in a wider, north-west 
European, market while allowing effective competition at the same time, leading to lower electricity prices.  
 
The direct benefit for households from an integrated north-west European market can amount to several 
hundred million euros per year, equivalent to several dozen euros per household per year. Consumers will 
also benefit indirectly, since electricity prices for business will be lower, leading (in part) to lower product 
prices.  
 
An additional benefit of north-west European integration is the fact that prices in the countries around the 
Netherlands are often much lower than in the Netherlands due to a different fuel mix. Integration would 
make these cheaper generated power available also to Dutch electricity users. 
 
Steps towards a north-west European market  
Many steps have been taken in the past few years to create an integrated north-west European market. In 
2005, the “Pentalateral Energy Forum” was formed, in which the ministers responsible for energy policy in 
the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg are working together to bring about an 
integrated market. In the same year, the regulators in Belgium, France and the Netherlands began working to 
achieve market integration in consultation with all the stakeholders. A regional action plan has been agreed in 





An important milestone in 2006 was the completion of market coupling between the Netherlands, Belgium 
and France, allowing better utilisation of the existing connections between the countries and the quotation of 
a single price in the day-ahead market as long as there is sufficient physical interconnection capacity. We 
therefore expect a strong improvement in utilisation on the Belgian border connection in 2007 as a result of 
the introduction of market coupling at the end of 2006. From January 2009, market coupling with Germany 
is set to lead to improved utilisation of the cross-border infrastructure with Germany. 
 
Expansion of the infrastructure  
Even if the existing infrastructure is optimally utilised, it will not be sufficient to achieve a genuinely 
integrated market. The market will have access to greater interconnection capacity in the next few years due 
to the clearance of identified physical bottlenecks in the north-west European system and the construction of 
additional connections. From the end of 2007, the Netherlands will have a connection with Norway (through 
the NorNed cable); the plans for a connection with Great Britain (BritNed) are at an advanced stage. As a 
result, the Netherlands will also be linked to the Nord Pool integrated Scandinavian marketplace and to the 
British market. The market will also have access to greater interconnection capacity with Germany in the next 
few years. In all these expansion projects it is still unclear what proportion of the new technical capacity will 
 
3 The Action Plan refers to the Central Western European region.    4
                                                          
need to be withheld by the grid managers to control the flows inherent in interconnected grids
4 and which are 
also influenced by features such as wind turbines and the increase in connections. 
 
Cross-border trade 
Electricity can be traded across borders for anything from one or more days ahead to several years ahead. 
However, cross-border trading on the delivery date itself
5 is not yet possible. The imbalance markets, which 
have been established by the grid managers to offset differences between planned production and delivery, 
are also national in nature. This means that fluctuations in supply and demand are still resolved domestically 
through trading or through the TenneT imbalance mechanism, except in the event of serious problems, when 
the grid managers intervene. According to the Action Plan, which has been aligned with European 
regulations, cross-border trading on the delivery date must be possible from 2008, and the imbalance 




4 Loop flows; transit flows. 
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Background and justification 
In accordance with the Electricity Act and the Gas Act, the Office of Energy Regulation (DTe) is required to 
promote competition in the energy markets. DTe has the statutory duty to monitor these markets closely and 
to report to the Minister of Economic Affairs annually on the extent to which market forces operate and 
effective competition occurs in the various energy markets (Section 5(3) of the Electricity Act of 1998). In so 
doing, DTe is required to monitor whether the energy markets are transparent and non-discriminatory. In 
liberalised energy markets, characterised by actual competition and sufficient transparency, end users – 
including consumers – ultimately reap the benefits of competitive prices, a differentiated product range and 
high-quality services.  
 
The purpose of this Monitor is to provide an insight into the development of the market and to provide a 




The Market Monitor uses indicators to track the development of the wholesale electricity market. These relate 
to the operation of the wholesale market as a whole. DTe reports not on individual companies but on an 
aggregate level. Indicators relating to competition and liquidity constitute the pillars of the Market Monitor.  
 
The extent of competition between producers influences the prices at which suppliers purchase electricity 
and hence the price of electricity for the end user. The degree of liquidity in the market determines the 
transaction costs applying to contracts and parties’ confidence in the market. Competition indicators concern 
market structure (e.g. the degree of concentration) and market outcomes (e.g. profitability). Liquidity 
indicators include trading volumes, price volatility and the spread between bid and offer prices.  
 
DTe has used various sources to obtain the indicators. It requested producers to supply electricity production 
data and plant characteristics. TenneT was requested to provide data on available production capacity and 
available import capacity. A liquidity survey was sent to all important players in the Dutch electricity market. 
DTe has also made use of public sources such as Platts and TSO Auction for prices and volumes.  
 
In order to reach judgments on the development of the wholesale market, results of indicators are compared 





The Market Monitor has a consultative group consisting of producers, traders and interest organisations. A 
draft of the Monitor report was distributed to members of the consultative group. Subsequently the 
consultative group met to discuss the findings of the Monitor. Specific suggestions for improvement were 
adopted as far as possible. The final report was not discussed with the consultative group and is the sole 
responsibility of DTe.  
 
   7
Reader’s guide 
There follows first a brief description of the main developments in 2006. Chapter 3 presents the Monitor 
results for competition and chapter 4 provides the results for liquidity. The final chapter deals with the 
current situation concerning the integration of electricity markets. With regard to both competition and 
liquidity, it makes a difference whether the Dutch electricity market stands alone or forms part of a larger 
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2  Main developments in 2006 
 
A number of developments took place in 2006 which have an influence on the operation of the Dutch 
wholesale electricity market: 
 
1.  Market coupling with Belgium and France (Trilateral Market Coupling) on 21 November 2006. The 
trading on the APX, Belpex and Powernext electricity exchanges is now connected, taking into 
account the available capacity at the various borders.  
2.  Spread annual auction for import capacity. Traders now have the possibility of acquiring capacity at 
the borders with Germany and Belgium twice a year (in addition to the existing monthly and daily 
auctions).  
3.  Start-up of the APX central intraday market. In addition to the day-ahead market, the APX introduced 
an intraday market in September 2006. In this market quarter hours of electricity are traded up to 
two hours before delivery.  
4.  EnergieNed and APX transparency initiative. Production data have been published since October 
2006 on the initiative of EnergieNed and APX. They were published initially on the APX site, but from 
June 2007 they were published on the EnergieNed website because the quality of the data was still 
insufficient.  
5.  Launch of the Regional Initiative for better market integration. The regulators of the energy markets 
in Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands published a list of priorities at the 
beginning of 2007 and formulated specific actions (Action Plan), including market coupling with 
Germany and cross-border intraday and balancing trade.  
6.  Loop flows through wind energy production. The production of electricity from wind parks in 
northern Germany provides increasing transit flows. TSOs are compelled to maintain larger reserves 
at the interconnectors, limiting the import capacity available to the market.  
7.  New plant construction projects. Producers announced further new investment plans in 2006, after 
the construction of new large-scale plants was announced for the first time in many years in 2005. 
The electricity producers’ new plant construction projects currently amount to around 9 GW. These 
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3  Competition in the Dutch wholesale market  
  
The high degree of concentration in the Netherlands remains a matter of concern. A result of this high degree 
of concentration is that in many hours one or more players are pivotal in meeting demand. There are clear 
indications that in the hours when this occurs the margin earned on electricity generation is considerably 
higher than in the other hours when no single player has a pivotal position. Further integration in the north-
west European market through an expansion of the available interconnection capacity can bring about a 
structural improvement. Consumers’ annual energy bills may fall by several dozen euros per household as a 
result. 
 
The degree of concentration of installed capacity (expressed in HHI) in 2006 is 1,995, which is comparable to 
the level in 2005. The degree of concentration of realised production in 2006 is an average of 1,984, almost 
250 points lower than in 2005. This HHI value means that there is still a highly concentrated market. The 
concentration of supply manifests itself in the pivotality of one or more market players during individual 
hours. For 31% of all hours in 2006, one or more players were pivotal in meeting demand. During peak hours 
the figure was as high as 59% of hours. Pivotality gives players the possibility of influencing market 
outcomes.  
 
The Monitor data show a clear connection between the pivotality of players and the mark-up (i.e. the 
difference between the electricity price and the marginal costs of the most expensive plant in operation): the 
more pivotal one or more players are, the higher is the mark-up. The pivotality of certain players is greatest 
during the hours when demand is high: the peak and super-peak hours
6. In peak hours, the electricity price 
was on average 9% higher than the marginal costs of the most expensive plant in operation, and in super-
peak hours it was as much as 21% higher.  
 
The high mark-ups during peak and super-peak hours more than offset the negative mark-ups that mainly 
occur during off-peak hours. On an annual basis, the resulting gross profit is in many cases more than 
sufficient to cover the annual costs of new investments. Part of the profit can therefore be seen as 
supracompetitive. This indicates that the high degree of concentration and the regular pivotality of one or 
more players have an impact on market outcomes.  
  
   
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the competition in the Dutch wholesale market. The Netherlands has over 21 GW of 
installed generating capacity. This is largely in the hands of a limited number of electricity producers. The 
production decisions and pricing by these producers to a large extent determine the market outcomes. A 
wholesale market with sufficient competition among producers benefits suppliers and ultimately end users. 
However, if producers exert insufficient discipline on each other, the result will be upward pressure on prices.  
 
                                                           
6 Peak hours are the hours from 7am to 11pm and super-peak hours are the hours from 9am to 6pm, in both cases on weekdays.   10
3.2 Competition  indicators 
 
The following indicators have been used to monitor competition in the Dutch wholesale market: 
-  Market structure: 
o  Degree of concentration: installed capacity and realised production 
o  Pivotal supplier index and residual supply index  
-  Behaviour: 
o  Dispatch of plants and utilisation of production capacity 
-  Market outcomes: 
o  Spark spread and dark spread 
o  Price-cost margin  
 
Market structure  
The degree of concentration shows whether there are many parties operating with low market shares or 
whether the market is characterised by a few large players. The construction of additional production capacity 
by a market participant or a merger between electricity producers changes the distribution of market shares 
and hence the degree of concentration in the wholesale market. A market participant with relatively large 
production capacity and a varied generating fleet may exert more liberty (in other words behave more 
independently) in the dispatch of plants and the price that is sought.  
 
Whether this market participant is also able to push prices higher is dependent on the other players’ ability to 
utilise flexible capacity in response. Electricity producers whose plants are already operating at full capacity 
can no longer react to any price increase. In the event that the other players’ total capacity is insufficient to 
meet demand, this market participant is pivotal and in principle able to influence the market outcome. The 
pivotal supplier index (PSI) states whether and how often such situations occur. The extent to which a market 
player is pivotal is shown by the residual supply index (RSI).  
 
Behaviour 
If one or more market participants can behave more independently and are able to influence the market 
outcome, this may lead to a higher market price. In that case strategic behaviour on the part of producers 
gains in relevance. 
 
For producers with large production capacity, the considerations surrounding the dispatch of plants may 
differ from those of smaller producers. Whereas a small producer will generate electricity with those plants 
for which generation is a profitable activity, for a large producer it may be more profitable to make no use or 
only limited use of an inherently profitable plant. Plants are utilised in principle in the order of their respective 
cost levels (merit order) up to the point at which the volume of electricity produced is sufficient to meet 
demand. The plant which produces at the highest marginal costs sets the market price. Other production 
units earn the difference between the market price and their own marginal costs, from which fixed costs can 
be covered. If a plant which would normally operate (at full capacity) is withheld (or used for limited 
production) from the market, the marginal plant moves up one or more positions in the merit order, leading 
to a higher market price. This producer may more than compensate for the missed revenues from the 
withheld plant with the higher margins on the plants which do operate. This practice of withholding can 
prove profitable particularly in the case of owned plants which are (relatively) low in the merit order.  
  
As well as size, producers also differ in the composition of their generating fleet. Producers with several 
flexible gas-fired plants higher in the merit order may have other considerations when quoting the prices at 
which they are prepared to produce electricity than parties which mainly have combined heat-power plants or   11
coal-fired units. After all, a flexible gas-fired unit can turn out to be the marginal plant at any time. A market 
participant can anticipate this by trying to increase the margin on this plant. However, by asking a price 
above the marginal cost level, this producer does run the risk of pricing himself out of the market. More 
expensive plants higher in the merit order, which stay closer to the marginal costs in terms of pricing, may 
then be called upon earlier. The more such plants a producer has available, the lower is the probability that 
this will occur. There are then only a limited number of other candidates to supply the marginal plant, so 




The profit achieved in the production of electricity may be an expression of scarcity in the market. Price peaks 
accompanied by high spreads give a positive signal for investment in new production capacity. High spreads 
or mark-ups can also reflect limited competition between electricity producers. In order to obtain a clearer 
view of this, the Monitor investigates connections between indicators of market structure (degree of 
concentration, pivotal supplier and residual supply), indicators of electricity companies behaviour (dispatch 
inefficiency and utilisation of production capacity) and indicators of profitability (price-cost margin or mark-
up). 
 
3.3  Structure of the market 
3.3.1 Degree  of  concentration 
 
The degree of concentration of installed capacity in 2006 is 1,995, which is comparable to the level in 2005. 
The degree of concentration of realised production in 2006 is an average of 1,984, almost 250 points lower 
than in 2005. In view of the continued high concentration in capacity, this must mean that the largest players 
are producing less. This HHI value indicates that the market is still highly concentrated.  
 
Approximately 25 electricity producers are active in the Netherlands. In terms of the size of generating fleets, 
the Netherlands has seven large and 18 small electricity producers. The large coal- and gas-fired plants and 
the combined heat-power plants which provide the bulk of production in the Netherlands are owned by a few 
large producers. Three-quarters of the Dutch generating fleet belongs to four electricity producers. 
 
The degree of concentration in the Dutch wholesale market is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI).
8 DTe calculates the following HHIs: installed capacity, capacity by cost segment, realised 
production and production by part day.
9  
 
HHI of installed capacity 
The HHI of installed capacity is calculated on the maximum capacity of the production units.
10 The value of 
this HHI for 2006 amounts to 1,995. If import capacity is also included, the HHI is 1,719.
11 These values 
correspond more or less to those of 2005.  
                                                           
7 When demand is not totally inelastic a higher price means a lower utilisation of available capacity.  
8 To calculate the HHI, the producers’ market shares are squared and then added together. The results range from 0 (full competition) 
to 10,000 (monopoly). If the value is higher than 1,800, there is a highly concentrated market; if the value is between 1,200 and 1,800, 
there is a moderately concentrated market. 
9 Information on plant characteristics and production data is obtained from electricity producers.  
10 The calculation includes all production units with a maximum electric power greater than 15 MW. This includes more than 80% of the 
available production capacity in the Netherlands.    12
 
The HHI of installed capacity is calculated on the total production capacity and makes no distinction in terms 
of the positions of plants in the merit order. However, decisions on the dispatch of plants and pricing by 
producers are closely related to the position of these plants in the Dutch generating fleet. For this reason, the 
Monitor also looks at the degree of concentration within the various segments of the merit order.  
 
HHI of installed capacity in segments of the merit order 
In the merit order the production units are classed according to the level of marginal costs
12. These comprise 
fuel costs, CO2 costs and operating and maintenance costs.
13 In order to show the degree of concentration 
through the merit order, this has been divided into four segments of approximately equal size. The results are 
shown in the table below.  
 
Cost segment   Cumulative capacity  HHI 
1 26%  2,654 
2 50%  2,315 
3 75%  3,248 
4 100%  1,961 
 
In the case of withholding, it is the plants that are low in the merit order, particularly segment 1 and to a 
lesser extent segment 2, that are relevant, because they can earn high margins relative to variable costs. The 
HHI value shows a high concentration for both segments. In the case of pricing, the segments concerned are 
those which contain the marginal plants: these are in particular segment 4 and to a lesser extent segment 3. 
Here too the HHI shows values typical of a highly concentrated market. Strategic considerations may 
therefore play a role in the dispatch and utilisation of plants. 
 
HHI of realised production 
The degree of concentration of installed capacity concerns the potential to influence market outcomes. The 
degree of concentration in realised production is assessed in order to gain a view of the actual distribution of 
market shares at any time. The HHI of realised production is calculated separately for each hour.  
 
The HHI of realised production in 2006 amounts to an average of 1,984. If imports are also included, the 
average is 1,643.
14 Compared to 2005, the HHI of realised production (excluding imports) is almost 250 
points lower. If imports are included, it is almost unchanged. 
 
HHI of realised production by part day  
Since market conditions can change in the course of a day, the HHI is broken down into part days. Market 
conditions also vary between weekdays and the weekend. The table below shows the HHI of realised 
production on weekdays divided into peak hours, off-peak hours, super-peak hours and shoulder hours. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
11 Available import capacity is allocated in blocks of 400 MW to the five largest producers and the remainder in blocks of 400 MW to 
new parties. This 400 MW is the maximum capacity which a market participant can acquire.  
12 Average variable costs (costs of producing 1 MWh of electricity) when operating at full capacity. 
13 Compared to HHI of installed capacity, plants for which no efficiency data were available were omitted from the calculation. This 
concerns a number of plants of small players. 
14 Actual imports are allocated to players on the basis of market shares, taking into account a maximum of 400 MW. The remaining 
volumes are allocated to new parties in blocks  of 400 MW.   
Part days  HHI (excluding imports) 
Peak hours: 07.00 – 23.00   2,039 
Super-peak hours: 09.00 – 18.00   2,062 
Shoulder hours: 07.00 – 09.00 and 18.00 – 20.00   2,034 
Off-peak hours: 23.00 – 07.00   1,931 
 
Figure 1 shows the frequency of HHI values in peak hours. The number of hours in which the HHI of realised 
production is below the threshold value of 1,800 points for a highly concentrated market is very limited. 
Progress has been made compared to 2005, when all hours had an HHI higher than 1,800. The tail on the 
right of the distribution has also largely disappeared in 2006. By way of comparison, in 2005 a considerable 
number of hours were still in the range of 2,400 to 2,900 points. In short, the distribution of HHI values for 
realised production has shifted clearly to the left. That means the market has become less concentrated. With 
an average of 2,039 points in peak hours, the market is still highly concentrated.  
 
Figure 1: Histogram of HHI of realised production in peak hours in 2006 
3.3.2  Pivotality of individual producers 



































































































half of cases, two players are pivotal simultaneously. One or more market players are therefore pivotal on a 
regular basis. The residual supply index averages 1.18 in 2006, and 0.99 in peak hours. The extent to which 
market players are pivotal also fluctuates widely: in almost one-fifth of peak hours, the RSI does not exceed 
0.9, i.e. the joint capacity of the other players is a maximum of 90% of total market demand. 
 
The analyses of the degree of concentration concern the distribution of market shares and any potential to 
ten 
exercise market power. The pivotal supplier and residual supply analyses make clear whether any actual 
potential to influence market outcomes has arisen. The pivotal supplier index shows whether and how of
players have had an opportunity to do so. The residual supply index shows the extent to which market 
participants are pivotal. 
 
  13  14
                                                          
Pivotal supplier index 
The pivotal supplier index (PSI) shows the percentage of hours in which an electricity producer’s capacity is 
required in order to meet market demand having regard to the combined capacity of the other producers.  
 
The calculation of the pivotal supplier index is based on available capacity: plants which market participants 
can utilise at any time to produce electricity (or which they can choose not to utilise or to utilise only to a 
limited extent).
15 Plants which are defective or undergoing maintenance or servicing at that time (outage) are 
not included. Due account has also been taken of any must-run character of plants. Industrial CHP units 
generally have extremely limited flexibility. For this reason, most of these units are not included in the PSI 
analysis. By contrast, CHP units for district heating are generally suitable for adjusting the production of 
electricity for supply to the public grid as required. Most district heating CHP plants are therefore included. A 
correction has been made to the must run portion in the analysis to take account of those district heating or 
industrial CHP units which can be partly utilised on a flexible basis.  
 
The PSI is based on a so-called binary indicator. The value is 1 if there is a pivotal supplier in a given hour and 
0 if that is not the case. This was analysed for each hour in 2006 for each individual player by deducting his 
capacity from the total available capacity and then comparing it to the market demand (by approximation 
total production by available units). If the joint capacity which all other players have available is insufficient to 
meet market demand, the respective player is a pivotal supplier. The PSI is calculated as the sum of all hours 
in which there is a pivotal supplier divided by the total number of hours in a year.  
 
The PSI analysis gives the following results: in 2006, there is a pivotal supplier in 31% of hours. For peak 
hours the percentage is 59% and for super-peak hours 76%. In almost half of cases there are two 
simultaneous pivotal players.
16 At least one player was pivotal in one or more hours on 262 days in 2006.  
 
Residual supply index 
The residual supply index shows the extent to which a player is pivotal. The more capacity that is required 
from a player to meet market demand, having regard to the capacity of the other producers, the greater 
possibility this player has to influence market outcomes.  
 
The calculation of the residual supply index is based on the same basic data as the calculation of the PSI. It 
therefore takes account of outages and any must-run character of plants.  
 
The RSI is expressed as a ratio. For each player, the market demand for each hour in 2006 is divided by the 
joint capacity of all the other players (i.e. total available capacity minus the available capacity of the respective 
player). If this produces a value of less than one, the joint capacity of the other players is insufficient to meet 
market demand and the respective market player is pivotal. The further below 1 the RSI value is, the more 
capacity is required from this player and the greater its pivotality. For each hour in 2006, it is then seen which 
player has the lowest RSI value. This lowest RSI per hour determines the RSI value for the sector as a whole.  
 
The results of the RSI analysis are as follows: on average in 2006, the RSI is 1.18. In peak hours, the RSI 
averages 0.99 and in super-peak hours 0.95.  
 
15 Information concerning availability of plants is obtained from TenneT. 
16 This does not mean that the competition between these parties increases. Rather, the competition decreases, because there is one 
fewer market participant to exert discipline on a pivotal player. Several players now have the incentive to withhold capacity and the 
expenses are shared with other parties (loss of revenues). They jointly have more capacity, so the price can be pushed higher. Whether 
this actually happens is connected to the extent to which the respective players are pivotal (relative to the situation in which one player is 
pivotal) and the extent to which they influence such pivotality in each other.  Figure 2 shows the distribution of RSI in peak hours. The pivotal supplier analysis has already shown that one 
or more players were pivotal in 59% of peak hours (hence an RSI value of below 1). The histogram shows that 
in 18% of peak hours the residual supply index does not exceed 0.9. In these hours the pivotal supplier must 
meet at least 10% of market demand. 
 



























































































Source: production data from electricity producers and availability data from TenneT 
 
 
3.4  Behaviour: dispatch and utilisation of plants 
 
The (calculated) dispatch inefficiency in individual portfolios does not differ markedly from the (calculated) 
dispatch inefficiency at sector level. This means that the calculated average dispatch inefficiency at sector 
level (17% in peak hours) cannot be explained by the strategic dispatch of plants, but may be the result of 
other factors. 
 
The degree of concentration, the pivotal supplier index and the residual supply index are indicators of the 
market structure. These indicators provide an insight into the potential which the market players have to 
influence market outcomes at any time. Market outcomes can be influenced by withholding plants.  
 
Dispatch inefficiency 
Strategic behaviour can manifest itself in dispatch inefficiency. After all, if the withholding of (relatively 
cheap) plants leads to the utilisation of more expensive plants, the result is more inefficient dispatch (at 
sector level).  
 
When a relatively expensive plant serves as the marginal plant in situations of low demand, that can indicate 
deliberate withholding of capacity in order to push prices higher. After all, in a competitive market the 
marginal plant will keep pace with demand, which means that when demand is low the marginal plant will 
have relatively low marginal costs and when demand is high the marginal costs of the marginal plant will be 
relatively high. In the event of withholding, the dispatch at sector level is less efficient than would otherwise 
be the case. 
 
In order to gain a view of this mechanism, it is necessary to determine on the one hand the actual price-
setting plant and on the other hand the marginal plant under fully competitive conditions. The actual price-
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setting plant is the most expensive plant which is online at any time. For each hour in 2006, it was 
ascertained which operating plant has the highest marginal costs. In order to determine the marginal plant at 
optimal dispatch, DTe commissioned KEMA Consulting to simulate the dispatch in 2006 using a dynamic 
dispatch model (Prosym).
17 This model took account of must-run characteristics, start-up costs and other 
dynamic characteristics which influence the optimal dispatch. The actual dispatch was then compared to the 
optimal dispatch.  
 
The difference in costs between the actual marginal plant and the marginal plant at optimal dispatch is a 
dispatch inefficiency. This dispatch inefficiency shows how much more expensive the production of a unit of 
electricity by the actual marginal plant is compared to the marginal plant at optimal dispatch. This difference, 
expressed in the marginal costs at optimal dispatch, gives the dispatch inefficiency. In 2006, the dispatch 
inefficiency at sector level in peak hours is an average of 17%. This result shows nothing more (or less for 




In order to determine whether the calculated dispatch inefficiency may be related to the strategic withholding 
of plants, we compare the dispatch inefficiency at sector level with that in individual portfolios. We can 
assume that strategic behaviour will not result in players making the dispatch more inefficient in their 
portfolio. If a player wishes to withhold capacity, such capacity will be at the margin, i.e. the most expensive 
capacity which could operate given the demand. If another player offers a more expensive plant in response, 
that will lead to higher marginal costs at sector level. To the extent that strategic behaviour manifests itself in 
dispatch inefficiency, it does so at sector level. We have therefore investigated the extent to which dispatch 
inefficiency at sector level differs from the dispatch inefficiency in individual portfolios.  
 
The statistical analysis shows that the dispatch inefficiency of the sector is on average not significantly higher 
than the dispatch inefficiencies within the portfolios of the individual producers. The conclusion is therefore 
that the analysis of the dispatch inefficiency does not indicate any strategic behaviour in the dispatch of 
plants.  
 
Extent of utilisation of available capacity 
Strategic behaviour may be indicated by the extent to which players utilise the available capacity. In 
competitive circumstances, an increase in demand for electricity leads to an increase in the utilisation of 
capacity. We can see from the data (with realised production data) that with higher total production the 
utilisation is logically also higher. With regard to individual players, we see that some players rarely utilise all 
or almost all of the available capacity, even when the total production in the sector is at a maximum level and 
the electricity price peaks. In the case of other players, by contrast, the available capacity is fully or almost 
fully utilised when the total production in the sector is high. The substantial non-utilisation of available 
production capacity when the total sector production (and the electricity price) is high, may indicate that 
capacity is being withheld for strategic reasons. This mechanism can arise when demand is not completely 
inelastic, as a result of which total demand decreases in response to the lower supply of electricity and the 
higher price. However, it is also possible that these differences in capacity utilisation among players are 
explained by differences in portfolios and specific circumstances. Further research is needed to show how 
pivotal players influence the market outcomes.  
 
17 KEMA Consulting, Analysis of the dispatch efficiency of generators in the Netherlands in 2006, October 2007. 
18 Since it is not possible to incorporate in a model all the real factors which determine the actual dispatch from one hour to the next, no 
further conclusions can be drawn from this average figure. It is possible that the observed inefficiency is entirely due to special 
circumstances which are not related to any strategic behaviour, such as the precise extent of must-run obligations or the level of fuel 
prices in specific contracts.  3.5  Market outcomes: prices and profitability 
 
Prices for electricity are on a higher level in 2006 than they were in previous years. Compared to the relatively 
low spreads in 2004 and 2005, the spreads have increased in 2006. The higher electricity prices have led to 
higher mark-ups, i.e. higher margins between the electricity price and the marginal costs of the most 
expensive plant in operation. In peak hours, the mark-up averaged 9% and in super-peak hours 21%. These 
high mark-ups more than offset the negative mark-ups that mainly occur in off-peak hours. On an annual 
basis, the resulting gross profit is in many cases more than sufficient to cover the annual costs of new 
investments.  
 
Indicators of profitability are the spark spread, dark spread and price-cost margin. The spark spread is the 
difference between the electricity price and the gas price and the dark spread is the difference between the 
electricity price and the coal price, taking efficiency of generation into account. The price-cost margin is the 
difference between the electricity price and the marginal costs of the most expensive plant in operation.
19
 
Spark spread and dark spread 
The (clean) spark spread for monthly (peak load) contracts initially declined but then rose sharply in the 
second half of 2006.
20 In the final quarter the spark spread was more than €40/MWh, a level unseen in the 
previous two years. As in 2005, the electricity price also rose sharply in the second half of 2006. As a result of 
the rise in the gas price in 2005, the spark spread was then around €20/MWh. Thereafter the gas price fell 
back somewhat, and a sharp fall was observed in the CO2 price, as a result of which the spark spread 
increased further in 2006. This calculation of the spark spread is based on TTF gas prices. In Q4 2006, the 
(oil-indexed) gas prices of GasTerra were clearly above those of the monthly contracts on the TTF; this effect 
has not been included in this analysis.
21 Figure 4 shows the trend in the spark spread over the last three years. 
 

























































































































Source: Platts, European carbon index, Carbix 
 
                                                           
19 The spark spread and dark spread are calculated using efficiencies of a hypothetical gas and coal plant. The price-cost margin is 
calculated using the efficiencies of the actual marginal (price-setting) units. 
20 The clean spark spread for monthly contracts is calculated according to the formula: Pe - Pg/R – Pco2*U/R (R=0.35; U=0.20196). 
21 A sensitivity analysis shows that even with higher gas prices in Q4 2006 the spark spread remains well above the 2005 level. 
  17For annual base load contracts, both the spark spread and the dark spread are calculated.
22 The electricity 
price in annual contracts has moved in a clearly upward direction since the beginning of 2005. The spark 
spread remained around €10/MWh for a long time due to the similar rise in the gas price. Midway through 
2006, the gas price reached a high of €30/MWh, after which it fell back within a few months to €20/MWh. 
Under the influence of a continued high electricity price, the spark spread, after dipping in the second 
quarter, rose to €20/MWh at the end of the year (see figure 5).  
 



























































































































When the electricity price began to rise, the dark spread moved in the same direction. The coal price 
remained below €10/MWh in both 2005 and 2006. Since the coal price hardly ever changes, the dark spread 
is determined by the electricity price. With a declining electricity price from August, the dark spread also 
declined in value, in contrast to the spark spread (see figure 6).  
 



























































































































                                                           
22 The calculation for annual contracts takes no account of CO2 (emission allowances are obtained free of charge, not interpreted here 
as opportunity costs) and an efficiency of 50% is assumed for gas-fired plants and 34% for coal-fired plants.   
 
Price-cost margin  
A market price which far exceeds the cost level of the marginal plant is conspicuous. If there is sufficient 
competition between producers, it can be expected that the market price will be in the region of the costs of 
the marginal producer. A limited mark-up for the marginal producer will also be necessary to cover the 
overheads and capital costs of a plant which is offline for a large part of the year. A high mark-up, by contrast, 
is an indication of limited competition.  
 
In order to visualise this, a comparison was made for each hour in 2006 of the market price (APX) and the 
highest level of marginal costs of all the production units operating at that time.
23  
 
The difference between the market price and the marginal costs is the price-cost margin. This states the 
extent to which the market price for electricity exceeds the costs of producing electricity in the marginal 
(price-setting) plant. This difference, expressed in the marginal costs of the price-setting plant, gives the 
price-cost margin index (PCMI). For 2006, the price-cost margin index in peak hours amounts to an average 
of 9% and in super-peak hours 21%.  
 
Figure 7 shows the frequency distribution of the price-cost margin index for peak hours in 2006. These are 
the mark-ups for the actual marginal plant in the hours in question. The histogram shows that the level of the 
mark-up may vary to quite some extent, with both high spikes and negative values.  
 


















































































































Source: production data from electricity producers  
 
 
Over the year as a whole, the negative mark-ups in off-peak hours are more than offset by higher mark-ups in 
peak hours. With the exception of the odd plant which only goes online in the event of extreme peak load, the 
annual gross profit per plant is more than sufficient to cover the annual overheads of a new investment. 
 
  19
                                                           
23 This is the price-setting plant (the most expensive plant online in that hour) in the analysis of dispatch inefficiency.  3.6  Interpretation: connection between structure and market 
outcomes 
 
The two indicators of market structure (HHI of realised production and the RSI) are closely connected: the 
higher the HHI (i.e. the more concentrated the production), the lower the RSI (i.e. the less pivotal some 
players are). Also indicators of market outcomes mark-up and price are closely related. This implies that 
costs of generation are only partly responsible for price movements. Finally the RSI is closely related to the 
mark-up: the lower the residual supply index, the higher the price-cost margin, and clearly higher mark-ups 
are seen as soon as there is a pivotal supplier (RSI below 1). This indicates that the high degree of 
concentration and the regular pivotality of one or more players affect market outcomes.  
 
The structure indicators show that the wholesale electricity market is a highly concentrated market in which 
one or more players are regularly pivotal. Figure 8 shows the average values of the HHI and the RSI for each 
hour through the day. The chart shows that the market is most concentrated during super-peak hours 
(between hours 10 and 18) and that the extent to which one or more players are pivotal is greatest during 
these hours. The trend in the HHI and the RSI shows a clear pattern over the day. In the morning hours the 
concentration increases and the RSI declines rapidly. Both indicators then show a reasonably stable picture 
during the day, after which the concentration decreases and the RSI rises in the evening hours.  
  




















Source: production data from electricity producers and availability data from TenneT 
 
Indicators of market outcomes show that on average there is a positive mark-up in peak hours. Figure 9 
shows the average mark-up (PCMI) and the average electricity price (APX) for each hour. It can be clearly 
seen that the mark-up and the electricity price follow an almost identical pattern. Variations in prices are 
therefore caused to a limited extent by higher generating costs and hence to a large extent lead to higher 
profit margins. 
 













































Source: APX and production data from electricity producers 
 
A combination of figures 8 and 9 shows that the RSI and the mark-up are related. An RSI value lower than 1 
(pivotal supplier) corresponds to a positive mark-up. When the RSI falls in the morning hours, the mark-up 
increases and reaches a peak in hour 12, when the RSI reaches its lowest value. The RSI then remains for a 
considerable time below 1 and the average mark-up for all these hours is positive. When the RSI moves back 
to the region of 1 and above, the mark-up becomes negative. Figure 10 illustrates directly the (negative) 
connection between the RSI and the mark-up. It also shows that clearly higher mark-ups arise with an RSI 
lower than 1, in other words when one or more players are pivotal.  
 






































Source: production data from electricity producers, availability data from TenneT and APX  
 
The statistical analysis, in which we have made a correction for the effect of actual scarcity 
24, shows that the 
RSI has a significant negative effect on the level of the mark-up. The lower the residual supply index is, the 
higher is the price-cost margin. The high degree of concentration and the regular pivotality of one or more 
players thus affect the market outcomes. In other words, the high concentration in the electricity market in 
2006 had the effect of pushing up prices. 
  21
                                                           
24 Measured in terms of unutilised available capacity.   22
 
‘Back-of-the-envelope’ calculation of the effect of market integration 
The statistical connection observed between the residual supply index and the price-cost margin makes it 
possible to estimate the effect of more market integration with neighbouring countries on the electricity 
price, for example for households. If the available interconnection capacity increases, prompting other 
providers to enter the wholesale market, the current players will be pivotal to a lesser extent or less 
frequently. As a result, the wholesale price (particularly during peak and super-peak hours) may decrease by 
5% to 10%. Due to the competition in the end user market, this price benefit will be largely passed on to the 
consumer. The direct benefit of an integrated north-west European market for households could therefore 
amount to several hundred million euros per year, equivalent to several dozen euros per household per year. 
Consumers will also benefit indirectly, since electricity prices for business will also fall, which in turn will be 
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4  Liquidity in the various marketplaces 
 
The liquidity of the Dutch wholesale market hardly improved at all in 2006. In previous years too, the Monitor 
has recorded a largely unchanged situation. The liquidity in the Netherlands is evidently at a level that can be 
expected given the current level of market integration.  
 
On the APX (spot market) the trading volume rose 17% in 2006 to 19.2 TWh and there is greater market 
depth, as a result of which the price sensitivity of additional demand bids is lower than in previous years. On 
Endex (forward market), the total volume rose 25% in 2006 to 131.3 TWh. A shift can be seen from trading on 
the futures exchange (launched in 2005) to the OTC clearing: the trade in standardised OTC contracts has 
decreased by almost 40%.  
 
The Netherlands still scores poorly in comparison with other countries: the Netherlands had more price 
peaks (APX) and a widening bid-offer spread (OTC). In the Dutch spot market, the number of times the APX 
exceeded €100/MWh increased by one-quarter. A particularly large number of price peaks were observed in 
Q1 2006. The average price level is also higher than in previous years. Compared to the foreign EEX and 
Powernext exchanges, the APX has a higher price level and shows the most price peaks. In the Dutch OTC 
market, the prices for forward contracts in 2006 are higher than in Germany and France. The bid-offer spread 
in 2006 (more than) doubled compared to 2005 for peak load forward contracts. Q2 2006 shows an 
exceptionally high spread. The bid-offer spread in the Netherlands is three times higher than in Germany and 
France (peak load forward contracts). The volatility in the Netherlands has remained roughly the same and is 
below that of Germany and France.  
 
The differences observed in comparison with neighbouring countries mean that there is still no international 
convergence in liquidity. The rising volumes and increasing market depth on the APX were achieved in the 
Netherlands, which is a positive sign. However, in view of the differences in liquidity compared to 




This chapter focuses on the development of liquidity in the various marketplaces. In a liquid market, standard 
transactions can generally be conducted rapidly, i.e. a counterparty can be found rapidly for each transaction 
and a large volume can be traded in each transaction without any noticeable effect on the price (“the market 
has sufficient depth”). Liquidity minimises the transaction costs and generates confidence among market 




Before attention is devoted to the liquidity indicators, there follows first a brief description of the 
marketplaces. The various marketplaces in the wholesale electricity market are: 
-  Bilateral market (forward and spot) 
-  OTC (forward and spot) 
-  Endex (forward) 
-  APX (spot) 
-  TenneT (imbalance)   24
 
Producers and suppliers can agree contract specifications among themselves, including the size, duration 
and term of electricity supplies. It is mainly forward contracts that are traded in this bilateral market, but spot 
contracts (day-ahead, intraday) are also concluded.  
 
Standardised contracts are available in the OTC (over the counter) market and on the APX and Endex 
exchanges. For standard volumes of electricity, contracts are available in these marketplaces with different 
durations and for multiple terms. In the OTC market, brokers match demand and supply for forward and 
spot electricity contracts. Parties can trade on the exchanges without the intermediation of brokers. Forward 
electricity contracts are traded on the Endex electronic trading platform (both physical and financial 
products). The APX electronic trading platform has been established for the spot electricity market.  
 
In addition there is the imbalance market. This market is maintained by TenneT, the manager of the national 
high-voltage grid, in order to maintain the balance in the system.  
 
Producers and suppliers are generally active in all marketplaces. Pure traders operate in all marketplaces with 
the exception of the imbalance market and the bilateral market. Large customers conclude contracts 
particularly in the bilateral market. The purchasing cycle which a supplier goes through is illustrative of the 
trading in various markets. In order to fulfil their delivery obligations, suppliers generally purchase in several 
phases, both at home and abroad (import). Purchases are made to meet the bulk of demand from two to 
three years to one month prior to delivery through bilateral contracts and standardised (long-term) forward 
contracts. The closer the delivery time, the more precisely demand can be estimated. Short-term forward 
contracts and day-ahead contracts are used to attune the rough procurement profile more closely to the 
actual profile to be supplied. On the delivery date itself, the profile is smoothed either by means of intraday 
contracts or, failing all else, through the imbalance market.  
 
 
4.3 Liquidity  indicators 
 
The degree of liquidity in the market is measured using the following indicators: 
-  Trading volume 
-  Number of parties 
-  Available contracts 
-  Volatility of prices 
-  Sensitivity of prices (to additional demand) 
-  Spread between bid and offer prices 
 
An increasing market volume and more participants trading in a wider range of contracts increase the 
possibilities for concluding a transaction, or for doing so rapidly. Less volatile prices, decreasing price 
sensitivity and a lower bid-offer spread show that demand and supply are more closely matched in terms of 
price and volume and that individual transactions can therefore be absorbed more effectively by the market.  
 
The Monitor report thus assesses the development of liquidity in the wholesale electricity market. Attention is 
devoted in turn to the APX (spot), Endex/OTC (forward) and TenneT (imbalance) markets. There is no 
further examination of the bilateral market, due to a lack of comparability. Attention is then focused on 
arbitrage between marketplaces and the extent of information provision (transparency). This chapter ends 
with an international comparison of liquidity. 
 4.4  Trading on the APX spot market 
 
The trading volume on the APX rose 17% in 2006 to 19.2 TWh. More traders are active and the degree of 
concentration has decreased. With a price level that was higher on average in 2006, the number of price 
peaks (higher than €100/MWh) increased by one-quarter compared to 2005. A particularly large amount of 
price peaks were recorded in Q1 2006. At the same time there appears to be greater depth in the market, and 
the price sensitivity of additional demand bids is 2% lower than in 2005 and 10% lower than in 2004. The 
APX launched an intraday market in 2006.  
 
The APX is a marketplace for trading in day-ahead contracts. For each individual hour, a price is arrived at on 
the basis of an auction. In order to gain a view of the liquidity on the APX, an analysis is made of the trading 
volumes, the number and market share of traders, available contracts, price peaks and price sensitivity. 
  
4.4.1 Trading  volume 
The trading volume on the APX spot market rose for the third successive year in 2006 and now amounts to 
over 19 TWh, as can be seen from figure 11.  


















4.4.2 Number  and  share of traders 
Seven new traders joined the APX and one left in 2006. There were a total of 47 traders on the APX at the end 
of 2006. By comparison, there was a net addition of three new traders on the APX in both 2004 and 2005. 
The share of the three most active APX participants in any trading hour in 2006 amounts to 44.5%, and for 
the five most active participants 60.6%. These shares are roughly the same as in previous years. Compared 
to 2005, the number of hours in which the share of the three most active traders exceeded 50% decreased by 
around one-third, and the number of hours in which the five most active traders had a share of more than 
two-thirds of the trading volume decreased by over 40%.  
 
  254.4.3 Available  contracts 
In addition to the day-ahead market, the APX launched an intraday market in September 2006. In this market, 
quarter hours of electricity can be traded up to two hours before delivery. The volume on the intraday market 
in 2006 amounted to 103 GWh.  
 
4.4.4 Price  peaks 
For over 90% of the hours in 2006, the price level on the APX was less than €100/MWh (see figure 12a).  
The number of times the APX peaked above €100/MWh increased in 2006 compared to previous years. The 
average price level of the APX also rose in 2006. It is striking to note the high price level and the associated 
large number of peaks (price higher than €100/MWh) in the first quarter. Figure 12b shows that this is a clear 
continuation of the price level and associated price peaks from the final quarter of the previous year. Prices 
appear to stabilise somewhat from the second quarter, but the average is higher than previously and there 
are also more price peaks.  
  26
Figure 12: (a) APX prices in 2006 and (b) APX average/number of price peaks per quarter in 2004-2006 
4.4.5 Price  sensitivity 
 bids provides an insight into the market depth of the APX. This is 









































































































































A simulation of additional demand
expressed in price sensitivity, the percentage price rise resulting from the additional demand. If there were an 
additional 500 MW of demand on the APX at maximum prices, the price rise in 60% of the hours would be 
less than 10% and in 80% of the hours less than 25% (see figure 13a).  
 
C
higher average prices. As can be seen in figure 8b, with the high price level of Q4 2005 and Q1 2006, the 
price sensitivity in the first quarter of 2006 is markedly lower than in the final quarter of 2005. Q1 2006 th
combines an exceptionally large number of price peaks with a remarkably low price sensitivity. Simulations 
for 5 MW and 50 MW of additional bids show comparable results for 2006 and for 2005. They are around 
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igure 13: (a) price sensitivity of the APX in 2006 and (b) APX average/price sensitivity per quarter in 2004-2006 
4.5  Trade in standardised OTC forward contracts 















































































































































































futures exchange (launched in 2005) to the OTC clearing: the trade in standardised OTC contracts has 
decreased by almost 40%. The number of participants on Endex has grown. In the OTC market the bid-offer 
spread on peak load forward contracts has (more than) doubled in 2006. Q2 2006 shows an exceptionally 
high spread. With OTC contracts at higher price levels, the volatility is comparable to previous years.  
 
Standardised forward contracts are traded on Endex or through brokers (OTC). In order to gain an insight 
and 
4.5.1  Trading volume on Endex 
sed in 2006. The combined volume of the OTC clearing and 
n 
igure 14: Trading and clearing volumes on Endex in TWh 
into the liquidity of the forward trade, reports are produced for Endex on trading volumes, the number of 
traders and available contracts; for OTC in general, an analysis has been made of the spread between bid 
offer prices and daily price fluctuations (volatility). 
 
As in 2005, the total volume on Endex has increa
futures exchange (trading and clearing) in 2006 amounts to 131.3 TWh, a rise of 25%. This growth is due 
entirely to the clearing activities. After a successful start in 2005, trading in standardised OTC contracts o























Source: Endex  
  28
4.5.2  Number of traders on Endex 
for the OTC clearing and the futures exchange. The 
en 
y 
 clearing member also joined in 2006. There are now a total of eight clearing members. A clearing member 
4.5.3  Available contracts on Endex 
 Endex remained the same in 2006 as in the final 
e 
4.5.4  Spread between bid and offer prices 
r three-quarters of the days in 2006. On over 
or quarterly OTC contracts, the bid-offer spread has increased sharply in 2006 compared to previous years, 
s more 
igure 15(a) bid-offer spread on OTC quarterly peak load contract in 2006 and (b) average OTC/spread per quarter 
The number of traders on Endex has increased both 
number of participants in OTC clearing (authorised to clear Dutch OTC contracts) have decreased by sev
to 25 in 2006, and in the futures exchange the number of participants (authorised to trade in Dutch electricit
contracts) has also increased by seven to 24.  
 
A
fulfils the role of service provider between the Endex participant and the clearing house. 
 
The number of available standard forward contracts on
quarter of 2005. Three new monthly contracts, two new quarterly contracts and a new annual contract wer
introduced in that quarter, for both base load and peak load. A total of 30 standard forward contracts are 
therefore now available on Endex.  
 
The bid-offer spread for quarterly contracts is at or below 2.5% fo
15% of days, the bid-offer spread exceeds 5% (see figure 15a).  
 
F
as can be seen in figure 15b. This wider spread is accompanied by a higher price for quarterly contracts. It is 
striking that a considerably wider spread can already be seen in the second quarter, while the price of 
quarterly contracts only increases strongly in the third quarter. This pattern is also evident in monthly 
contracts, but there the spread in the third quarter is already below 2% again. Similarly in the annual 
contracts, the considerably higher spread is only evident in the second quarter, and the price increase
gradually over the quarters.  
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 4.5.5 Volatility  of  prices 
For two-thirds of the days in 2006, the price of quarterly contracts changes by a maximum of 1.5% from day 
to day. On 15 days in 2006, the price of a quarterly contract differed from the previous day’s price by more 
than 5% (see figure 16a).  
 
The volatility of quarterly contracts in 2006 is therefore somewhat higher than in 2005, as can be seen from 
figure 16b. Hence, the considerably higher price level in 2006 has only been accompanied to a limited extent 
by greater volatility. The volatility does move with the price level, but this trend is more subdued. In the case 
of monthly contracts, the volatility in 2006 has clearly declined, while the price level shows a rising trend. For 
annual contracts, the volatility is comparable to previous years, except in the second quarter, when volatility 
increases sharply.  
 













































































































4.6  Transactions on the TenneT imbalance market 
 
In the market for control and reserve power, 30% more volume was called upon in 2006 than in 2005. The 
number of time units in which TenneT had to call upon reserve power decreased further; it halved compared 
to 2003. In short: in time units when calls are made, much more is called upon. With a higher average price 
level in 2006, the number of price peaks in the imbalance market has decreased.  
 
In the market for control and reserve power, the parties issue bids at which they are prepared to produce 
more or less than is stated in the programmes. The imbalance price is arrived at on the basis of a bidding 
ladder. This is the price at which TenneT offsets the imbalance among the market participants (caused by 
differences compared to programmes) for each quarter. The following are analysed in turn: volumes, 
excess/shortage in offered control and reserve power and the imbalance price peaks.  
 
4.6.1  Volumes in the market for control and reserve power 
In 2006, TenneT called upon almost 30% more control and reserve power than in 2005. The total control and 
reserve power called upon in 2006 is approximately 322 GWh (see figure 17a). Despite the fact that more was 
called upon in 2006, there was a decrease in the number of programme time units (PTUs) in which the 
  29offered control and reserve power was insufficient. The number of PTUs in which TenneT had to call upon 
reserve power also decreased in 2006 (see figure 17b). Both have (more than) halved since 2003.  
 







































4.6.2  Price peaks in the market for control and reserve power 
For three-quarters of the number of PTUs, the imbalance price remains below €100/MWh. In 8% of the time 
the price in the imbalance market has exceeded €200/MWh (see figure 18a).  
 
The average price level in 2006 was somewhat higher than in 2005, while the number of PTUs with a price in 
excess of €250/MWh decreased. Figure 18b shows that the first quarter differs markedly from the remainder 
of the year. Compared to the final quarter of 2005, in which there is a comparable price level, the number of 
price peaks in the first quarter of 2006 is clearly lower. At the same time, the prices themselves show a rising 
trend, which corresponds to the price trend on the APX.  
 










































































































































  304.7  Arbitrage and substitution 
 
Prices on the day-ahead OTC market are generally higher than on the APX. This difference increased further 
in 2006. There is no clear picture of the price relationship between the TenneT imbalance market and the 
APX. Traders mostly state that they see day-ahead products on the OTC and the APX as substitutes; the 
possibilities for arbitrage are judged to be less good. 
 
In a liquid market, price differences between comparable standardised contracts which are traded through 
various channels (exchange, through a broker and bilaterally) are arbitraged. If the prices for comparable 
contracts in the various marketplaces do not tend towards the same value, the possibilities for arbitrage are 
not being fully exploited. A difference in price can be caused by a difference in transaction costs, a lack of 
transparency (too little reliable information among traders) or congestion at the interconnectors. 
 
Day-ahead OTC and APX 
Figure 19 shows the trend in the price difference between day-ahead contracts on the OTC market and on the 
APX, expressed as a percentage of the OTC price. A positive value means that the price on the OTC market is 
higher than on the APX. The price difference between OTC and APX contracts appears to have been 
reasonably constant over the last few years. The large price rises on the APX (as on Powernext and the EEX) 
at the end of 2005 which only occurred in part on the OTC market, appear to be an exception in the pattern 
over the last few years. At the end of 2006, an opposite movement appears to occur for a short time, with a 
relatively sharp rise in the price of OTC contracts.  
 





























































































































































Source: APX, Platts 
 
In the survey of traders, half of the respondents state that they consider day-ahead products on the OTC and 
the APX to be substitutes. Ten per cent state that they do not see them in that way. Respondents’ views are 
divided on the possibilities for arbitrage between these two markets. One-third state that there are good 
possibilities and another one-third state that the possibilities are poor.  
 
TenneT imbalance and APX 
Figure 20 shows the trend in the price difference between the TenneT imbalance price and the APX price, 
expressed as a percentage of the TenneT imbalance price. A positive value means that the imbalance price is 
  31higher than the APX price.
25 As in 2005, the chart shows a volatile picture for 2006, with periods of 
substantially higher APX prices alternating with periods in which the TenneT imbalance price is higher. The 
pattern over the year as a whole is nevertheless comparable, with peaks and troughs around the same 
months. The 2004 picture, in which the TenneT imbalance price was structurally above the APX price, has not 
been repeated since that year.  
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Figure 20: Price difference on the TenneT imbalance and APX 2004 – 2006 (30-day moving average) 
4.8 Transparency   

































































































































































concerning demand, production and transmission. With regard to trading, the transparency on the OTC 
market is considered to be too low. The transparency with regard to interconnection is generally considered 
to be satisfactory, except for transparency on the way in which available interconnection capacity is calculated 
and the available capacity itself. The Congestion Management Guidelines at the end of 2006 make it possible 
to enforce greater transparency.  
 
A transparent wholesale electricity market makes a large contribution to ensuring that electricity demand and 
nd 
.  
ttention is devoted in turn to transparency concerning demand, production and transmission, transparency 
                                                          
supply can be matched at the lowest possible cost. Transparency means that traders have access to accurate, 
relevant information on the wholesale electricity market so that they can buy and sell electricity at minimum 
transaction costs. The relevant market information includes the availability of production capacity, 
transmission capacity and interconnection capacity; information on the rules in force in exchanges a
auctions (including calculation methods); and information on the results of trading: prices and volumes
 
A
with regard to interconnection; and transparency with regard to trading.  
 
 
25 Price formation takes place at different times in the APX and the imbalance market. Any price comparison must therefore be 
interpreted cautiously. A better insight would be obtained from a comparison between the APX day-ahead price and the APX intraday 
price on the one hand and the APX intraday and the TenneT imbalance price on the other hand. The APX intraday market has not been 
operating long enough to present an analysis for 2006.  Demand, production and transmission 
The survey of traders shows that the transparency relating to demand, production and transmission in the 
Netherlands still leaves something to be desired. Figure 21 shows the results for 2006. 
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Source: DTe survey 
 
Compared to the survey results for 2005, traders believe that transparency has increased across the board. 
Production data have been published since October 2006 on the initiative of EnergieNed and APX. They were 
published initially on the APX site, but from June 2007 publication they were published on the EnergieNed 
website because the quality of the data was still insufficient. In this case, the provision of incorrect 
information can be seen as worse than the situation in which no information was available.  
 
Interconnection 
The survey of traders shows that transparency with regard to the interconnection is mostly viewed positively. 
Figure 22 shows the results of the survey. 
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Source: DTe survey 
 
Compared to the 2005 survey, traders’ perception is that there is greater transparency relating to 
interconnection, although there appears to be no appreciable change in the information provision on the 
above components. 
  33 
Trading 
Respondents to the trader survey state in particular that transparency in the OTC market as a whole is too 
low. For the APX and Endex, this mainly concerns the number of active participants in the trading, as shown 
in figure 23.  
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Figure 23: Traders’ opinions on the extent of information provision on trading in 2006  
f the 2005 survey, traders are less positive than in the previous year. There may be 
hese survey results largely correspond to the analysis of the current level of market transparency conducted 
ied 
4.9 International  comparison 
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Compared to the results o




as part of the Regional Initiative. The adoption of new European guidelines (the “Congestion Management 
Guidelines”) at the end of 2006 has created a legal basis for the improvement of market transparency in 
relation to demand, production, transmission and interconnection. On a regional level, work is being carr
out on a uniform interpretation of these new guidelines to prepare for their actual implementation. There is 
as yet no legal basis for the improvement of transparency in the OTC market. The degree of transparency in 






of liquidity in the Netherlands evidently remains stuck at more less the same level. In the spot market, 
trading volumes on the exchanges continue to show a rising trend. The price level of the APX in 2006 is 
generally higher than that of the EEX (average of over 12%) and Powernext (average of over 15%). The APX 
also has the largest number of price peaks, which are particularly visible in Q1. The highest peaks, however, 
occur on the EEX and Powernext. In the forward market, Dutch prices are generally higher than in Germany 
and France. For monthly peak load contracts, the price is an average of 17% higher in 2006, and in the case 
of annual base load contracts an average of 15% higher. The bid-offer spread in the Netherlands is three 
times higher (forward peak load contracts), and the difference is particularly visible in Q2. By contrast, the 
volatility of prices in the Netherlands is somewhat lower than in Germany and France.  
   35
n international comparison shows whether developments in the Dutch wholesale market are also occurring 
4.9.1 Spot  market 
rading volumes 




igure 24: Trading volumes on the APX, EEX and Powernext in TWh per month in 2004-2006 
rice trends 
he price movements on the various exchanges are relatively similar in 2006, as can be seen in figure 25. As 
s, the price level of the APX is generally higher than that of the EEX and Powernext. This is 
                                                          
A
in other countries or are specific to the Netherlands. The spot markets in the Netherlands (APX), Germany 
(EEX) and France (Powernext) are compared in terms of trading volumes, price trends and price peaks. For 
the forward markets in these countries, an analysis is made of the price trend, the spread between bid and 




Trading volumes on 
activity sometimes alternate with substantially lower volumes (see figure 24). For the French and particul
the German exchanges, the first half of the year shows a decline compared to the volumes at the end of 2005.
The APX saw a continued increase in trading volumes over this period, but marked time when volumes on 
the German and French exchanges picked up again in the second half of the year. In comparison with 
electricity consumption in those countries, the Dutch spot market is large relative to France, but comp






































































































































most clearly evident in the ‘trough’ of the second quarter and the ‘peak’ of the final quarter. The APX is the 



























































































































Source: APX, EEX, Powernext 
 
Price peaks 
The highest price peaks in 2006 are nevertheless found on the EEX and Powernext (see figure 26). In the final 
week of July, the highest daily average price on the EEX is €543.72/MWh and on Powernext €416.93/MWh. 
The highest daily average on the APX in the same week is €263.64/MWh. This is also the only period in which 
the exchanges all surged to high levels. The other large spikes in 2006 are caused by an individual exchange. 
On two occasions this was the APX and on one occasion the EEX.  
 






















































































































Source: APX, EEX, Powernext 
 
In terms of quantity, the APX has the largest number of price peaks. In the whole of 2006, there were 771 
hours (8% of the time) when the APX price was above €100/MWh. These price peaks are concentrated 
mainly in the first quarter. The other exchanges also show the largest number of peaks in this quarter. In the 
remainder of the year, the EEX and Powernext only show a substantial number of peaks in the third quarter, 
while the APX shows at least 100 hours in the other quarters with prices above €100/MWh. Figure 27 
presents an overview.  
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Figure 27: Number of price peaks (hours P>100) on the APX, EEX and Powernext in 2006  
4.9.2 Forward  market 
rice trends 
be seen that the price level in the Netherlands is generally higher or much higher 
igure 28 shows the prices for monthly peak load contracts in 2006. In approximately three-quarters of the 
ch 




















In the forward market it can 
than in Germany and France. Prices also follow each other closely in Germany and France, while the 
Netherlands more often shows a different pattern.  
 
F
year (March to November inclusive), the prices in the Netherlands are considerably higher, with price 
movements remaining roughly similar. In January, February and December, the three countries are mu



























































































































 Figure 29 shows the prices for annual base load contracts. Over the year as a whole, prices in the 
Netherlands are much higher, with the exception of a few days at the end of April and the end of May. The 
price movements in the three countries are reasonably similar for large parts of the year. In other periods, 
such as June and August, the price trends are opposite. 
 


























































































































Spread between bid and offer prices 
The spread between bid and offer prices for peak load contracts in 2006 is considerably higher in the 
Netherlands than in Germany and France. Figure 30 shows the average bid-offer spread for monthly peak 
load contracts for each quarter. Over the year as a whole, the average bid-offer spread in Germany and France 
is around 1%, while in the Netherlands it is 3.4%. The strikingly high spread in the Netherlands in the second 
quarter, averaging more than 7%, was clearly an isolated case. In the other quarters a pattern appears to 
emerge: the Netherlands has the highest spread, Germany the lowest, with France closer to Germany than 
the Netherlands. In the case of quarterly peak load contracts, a much higher spread can also be seen for the 
Netherlands in Q3, which is not matched in Germany or France. Annual peak load contracts also have a 
higher spread in Q2, but for Q1 there is a strikingly low spread comparable to that of Germany and France.  
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or base load contracts, there is less difference between the bid-offer spread in the Netherlands and that of 
A 
igure 31: Bid-offer spread on annual base load contracts in the Netherlands, Germany and France in 2006 
Volatility of prices 
 which the price varies from day to day) is lower for peak contracts in the Netherlands 
 lowest 
igure 32: Volatility of monthly peak load contracts in the Netherlands, Germany and France in 2006 
F
Germany and France. Figure 31 shows the average bid-offer spread for annual base load contracts in each 
quarter. The Netherlands even shows the lowest spread on annual base load contracts in the first quarter. 






The volatility (extent to
than in Germany and France in 2006. Figure 32 shows the volatility of monthly peak load contracts. The 
average daily change in the price of monthly contracts in the Netherlands is 2.5%, while in Germany and 
France it is 2.7% and 3% respectively. The volatility shows a fluctuating picture through the year in all 
countries. Generally, however, a pattern is evident, except in the third quarter: the Netherlands has the
volatility and France the highest, with Germany situated roughly in the middle. The volatility in all three 


































   40
or base load contracts, the volatility in the Netherlands is likewise low in comparison with Germany and 




France. Figure 33 shows the volatility for annual base load contracts. In the case of quarterly and monthly 
base load contracts, the volatility in the Netherlands and France is reasonably comparable, but Germany 
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5  The Dutch market in a north-west European perspective 
 
As a result of congestion in the cross-border connections, players in the Dutch wholesale market are only 
disciplined to a limited extent by foreign supplies and the development in liquidity continues to be 
determined by the Dutch situation. Market integration is further limited by the fact that there are still no 
possibilities for trading electricity across borders on the delivery date, because transmission capacity is then 
no longer available. 
 
The interconnectors with Germany are fully utilised 20% of the time and interconnection capacity with 
Belgium 19% of the time. It is not possible to import more power during those hours. There is also 
unexploited potential. Available import capacity is not always fully utilised at times when electricity prices 
elsewhere are lower. For 50% of the hours in which the Dutch electricity price is higher than in Germany or 
France, there is underutilisation of interconnection capacity. Congestion is thus caused on the one hand by 
insufficient physical capacity, and on the other hand the current system of capacity allocation is not operating 
in an optimal way.  
 
Market coupling with Belgium and France (2006) is allowing better utilisation of existing import capacity, 
and the construction of a connection with Norway (2007) means more physical capacity. These are steps in 
the right direction. The Action Plan for the Central West European Region includes major steps for further 
market integration. In particular, market coupling with Germany and the introduction of cross-border 
intraday trade will lead to better utilisation of interconnectors. Price convergence with the neighbouring 
countries will have a major effect on competition because it reduces the scarcity of import capacity. As long 
as this is not achieved by means of investments in new production capacity in the Netherlands and/or 




This chapter deals with the interaction between the Dutch wholesale market and the electricity markets in the 
surrounding countries. It focuses attention on the availability and utilisation of cross-border transmission 
capacity. Almost 95 TWh of electricity was generated in the Netherlands in 2006 (after deduction of 
production for own consumption) and over 21 TWh was imported from abroad for approximately 112 TWh of 
domestic consumption 
27. In comparison with 2005, almost 2 TWh less was produced and over 3 TWh more 
was imported, with an increase in domestic consumption.
28 The Netherlands is a net importer of electricity; 
this position has been reinforced in the past few years.  
 
5.2  The Dutch generating fleet 
 
The Dutch generating fleet is characterised by a large proportion of gas-fired plants. Germany has a relatively 
large number of coal-fired plants, while in Belgium and France the emphasis is on nuclear plants. The higher 
fuel costs for the generation of electricity by means of gas-fired plants in 2006 result in a price difference 
averaging over 12% compared to Germany and over 15% compared to France in the spot electricity market. 
Investments in new production capacity in the Netherlands may lead to more price convergence with the 
neighbouring countries.  
                                                           
27 The difference is due to grid losses. 
28 Source: CBS Elektriciteitsbalans (StatLine), provisional figures for 2006.  5.2.1  Composition of the generating fleet 
The Netherlands has over 21 GW of generating capacity. Natural gas and coal- (plus biomass-) fired plants, 
together with the nuclear plant, provide almost 15 GW of generating capacity. Decentralised capacity, mainly 
combined heat-power plants, accounts for over 5 GW and sustainable generation accounts for approximately 
1.5 GW. No new large-scale capacity entered service in 2006. Figure 34 shows the composition of the 
generating fleet in percentages. 
 






gas kolen (+ biomassa) nucleair wkk duurzaam overig
Source: ECN, CBS 
 
Electricity producers’ new construction projects currently represent approximately 9 GW.
29 These plants are 
due to enter service from 2009 to 2013. They include over 3.5 GW of gas-fired plants (combined cycle), over 4 
GW of coal- and biomass-fired plants and a 1.2 GW coal gasification plant. An expected 300 MW of total 
energy plants are expected to be completed in 2007. Coal-fired plants dominate the new construction 
projects, with the preferred locations being Eemshaven or the Maasvlakte. The EU ETS does not yet 
discourage parties from investing in production capacity with high CO2 emissions. Due to transmission 
limitations in the high-voltage grid, it will not be possible to accommodate all the new construction projects 
in the short term. In addition, it remains to be seen how many GW of production capacity will actually be 
realised by the parties. The proportion of sustainable energy will increase further in the future (particularly 
wind) and there are currently no plans to build new nuclear plants.  
 
5.2.2  Comparison of the fuel mix for electricity production 
Most of the electricity produced each year in the Netherlands comes from gas-fired plants. In comparison 
with the neighbouring countries too, the Netherlands also produces a relatively large proportion of electricity 
using natural gas as the fuel. In Germany the emphasis is on production from coal-fired plants and in 
Belgium and France from nuclear plants. Figure 35 shows the proportion of each type of fuel used in 
electricity production in the Netherlands and surrounding countries (figures for 2005).  
 
In the Netherlands, this mix of fuel for electricity production shows a strong similarity to the respective 
shares of fuel for installed capacity. In Germany, the proportion of coal in electricity production is higher and 
that of gas lower than the fuel mix for installed capacity. In Belgium and France, the proportion of nuclear 
power in production is higher in comparison with the installed capacity. 
  42
                                                           
29 Source: ECN, Energeia, producers’ websites.   43
Figure 35: Differences in the fuel mix in the Netherlands and surrounding countries (electricity production) 
ue to the relatively low price of coal, the fuel costs of coal-fired plants for electricity production are usually 
ed by 
 
5.2.3  Price differences compared to neighbouring countries 
r 12% higher than 
igure 36: Price difference in spot markets in the Netherlands and surrounding countries (as % of APX price)  
                                                          









much lower than those of gas-fired plants, which generally have a higher fuel efficiency.
30 In 2006, the 
average coal price is one-third of the average gas price.
31 This relationship between fuel costs is unalter
the price of CO2 emission allowances in 2006, having regard to the higher emissions of CO2 at coal-fired 
plants. In a country with a relatively large amount of coal-fired plants, it may be expected on the basis of the
fuel costs and the low CO2 price that the electricity price will be lower than in a country in which a relatively 
large proportion of energy is produced from gas-fired plants.  
 
The prices in the Dutch spot electricity market (APX day-ahead) in 2006 are on average ove
on the German exchange (EEX) and over 15% higher than the French price (Powernext). Figure 36 shows that 
the average price difference compared to France is greater than the difference compared to Germany and that 
for both countries the price difference in peak hours (based on the Dutch definition: between 7am and 11pm) 












Source: APX, EEX, Powernext 
 
30 Coal-fired and nuclear plants have higher overheads (depreciation charges, etc.). 
31 Coal price: CIF ARA 90-day; gas price: TTF monthly.   44
connections 
ts usually acquire all of the import capacity that is made 
5.3 Cross-border 
 
In the auctions of border capacity, market participan
available. Not all the acquired capacity is actually used to import electricity. On average, almost 3600 MW 
was available in 2006, of which an average of over 2900 MW was used. The available capacity is not always 
fully utilised, even when the Dutch electricity price is markedly higher than the German or French price.  
 
The Netherlands currently has cross-border connections with Germany and Belgium. Under normal 
circumstances there is 3,600 MW of interconnection capacity available to the market at these connections, 
ction 
.3.1  Explicit auction of border capacity 
uctions held by the respective TSOs. In this 
nnual, monthly and daily basis. A spread annual 
ty 
 
figure 37.  
apacity: available, acquired and used 
ity acquired by market players 
arket players acquire 
                                                          
rising under favourable conditions to 3,850 MW. Having regard to the physically available interconne
capacity, 4,700 MW could be available to the market. The TSOs hold reserves, in particular due to transit 
flows caused by wind energy production in northern Germany. This limits the securely available capacity.  
 
5
Market players can acquire import capacity by bidding at the a
system of explicit auctions, capacity is made available on an a
auction (twice a year) took place for the first time in 2006. Players who do not nominate imports on capaci
acquired in the annual or monthly auction lose this capacity in the daily auction (on the basis of the “use it or 
lose it” principle). The price in the border auction is set at the lowest bid at which capacity has been acquired.
If the demand is lower than the available capacity, this capacity is free. TSOs are required to use the auction 
proceeds to eliminate restrictions in the transmission capacity for the cross-border grid.
32
 
The average prices (on a daily basis) of the daily auctions of import capacity are shown in 
 





















































































































Source: TSO Auction 
5.3.2  Import c
Figure 38 shows daily averages of available interconnection capacity, the capac
at the various auctions and the actual imports. It can be clearly seen that the m
practically all of the available capacity. In 2006, the average difference between available and acquired 
capacity is only 15 MW. It can also be clearly seen that in general the acquired capacity is not fully used in 
 




igure 38: Import capacity in the Netherlands and surrounding countries (daily averages, MW) 
igure 39 shows the daily average price difference between the APX and Powernext and the EEX, expressed as 
n 
 
igure 39: Price difference between APX and EEX/Powernext (daily averages, base load) 
F
Source: TenneT, TSO Auction 
 
F
a percentage of the APX price in 2006. Rising price differences between countries generally correspond to an 
increase in cross-border traffic. For example, in February, when there are small price differences, relatively 
little is imported, but when price differences increase in March, imports also show a rising trend. Even whe
the difference between the APX price and the EEX and Powernext ‘peaks’ in April, it is still evident that players
are not using all the capacity to import. Limited or volatile availability of interconnection capacity to some 
extent contributes to larger price differences between countries. For example, August is a period of limited 
availability in which the APX regularly ‘peaks’ compared to both Powernext and the EEX. It can also be seen 































































































































































































































Source: APX, EEX, Powernext 
 
 5.4  Congestion at the interconnectors 
 
Congestion occurs if the interconnection capacity is fully utilised, but also occurs virtually if the 
interconnectors are underutilised. The interconnectors with Germany are fully utilised 20% of the time and 
with Belgium 19% of the time. For 50% of the hours in which the Dutch electricity price is higher than the 
German or French price, the available import capacity is not fully utilised. Congestion thus results in part 
from a shortage of physical capacity and in part from an inefficient allocation of import capacity. Having 
regard to the extent of underutilisation, it is recommended that market coupling be introduced at all borders, 
together with cross-border intraday trading.  
 
Cross-border connections enable an expensive country to import cheap electricity from abroad. Imports also 
boost the liquidity in the Dutch marketplaces. However, the interconnection capacity is bound by physical 
limits. If the interconnector is full, price differences can persist. From the competition perspective, domestic 
producers are then no longer subject to the disciplining effect of imports. The consequences of any 
congestion are therefore reflected in the levels of liquidity and competition in the Dutch wholesale market. 
For this reason, the Monitor looks at the extent of congestion at the interconnectors.  
 
Congestion occurs if the interconnection capacity is fully utilised, but also occurs virtually if the 
interconnectors are underutilised. In the case of full utilisation, market players would want to import more, 
but are simply unable to do so due to physical restrictions in the connections. When individual market 
players do not use all the acquired capacity to import electricity, in spite of a price difference compared to 
neighbouring countries, there is underutilisation (unexploited potential).  
 
5.4.1 Full  utilisation 
On the interconnectors with Germany, there is full utilisation 20% of the time (Germany to the Netherlands), 
and in the connections with Belgium the figure is 19% (Belgium to the Netherlands).
33 Figure 40 shows that 
full utilisation occurs relatively more often during peak hours than over the whole day. The interconnectors 
with Germany are fully utilised for more than one-quarter of peak hours.  
 











Source: TenneT, TSO Auction, Elia 
                                                           
33 For the purposes of this Monitor, the interconnection capacity is considered to be fully utilised if the nominated imports exceed 97.5% 
of the available capacity. 
  465.4.2 Underutilisation 
In the hours in which the Dutch electricity price is higher than in Germany and/or Belgium, the available 
import capacity is not fully utilised in 50% of the hours.
34 Figure 41 shows that in the connections with 
Belgium there is slightly more underutilisation of import capacity, which is most evident in peak hours.  
 












Source: TenneT, TSO Auction, Elia 
 
If we consider figures 40 and 41 together, congestion is both a question of physical shortage of capacity and 
of inefficient allocation of the available capacity.
35 On the one hand, for approximately one-fifth of the hours in 
2006, there would have been a need for greater import capacity. On the other hand, for half of the time, more 
could have been imported using the existing capacity. The degree of underutilisation observed shows that 
there is a need for more efficient use of the available capacity. This underutilisation could be brought to an 
end by the introduction of market coupling at all borders and the implementation of cross-border intraday 
trading.  
 
5.5  Towards a north-west European market 
 
With market coupling between the Netherlands, Belgium and France, the border capacity for day-ahead trade 
is auctioned implicitly on the electricity exchanges. Underutilisation of interconnection capacity is no longer 
possible in the event of price differences between those countries. On the interconnectors with Belgium, 
there was congestion for 19% of the time during that period (22 November – 31 January).  
The Action Plan for the Central West European Region includes major steps for further market integration. In 
particular, market coupling with Germany and the introduction of cross-border intraday trade will lead to 
better utilisation of interconnectors. The so-called flow-based approach is intended to lead to higher values 
for the available interconnection capacity. Price convergence with the neighbouring countries will have a 
major effect on the competition because it reduces the scarcity of import capacity. As long as this is not 
achieved by means of investments in new production capacity in the Netherlands and/or investments in 
interconnectors, the high degree of concentration in the Netherlands will remain a focus of attention.  
 
                                                           
34 For the purposes of this Monitor, there is underutilisation of interconnection capacity if, in spite of a price difference on the 
exchanges, the nominated imports amount to less than 97.5% of the acquired capacity. 
35 The analysis is based on a comparison of exchange prices. The trading times differ on the respective exchanges. In addition to 
exchange trading, imported power also comes from other types of contract (OTC, bilateral).  
  47  48
                                                          
An important development in 2006 is the completion of market coupling with Belgium and France (Trilateral 
Market Coupling) on 21 November. Trading on the APX, Belpex and Powernext electricity exchanges is now 
connected, taking into account the available capacity at the various borders.
36 The interconnection capacity 
for day-ahead trade is thus auctioned implicitly on the electricity exchanges. Congestion now only occurs if 
the capacity is fully utilised. If the capacity is not fully utilised, electricity prices in the respective countries are 
the same. This new allocation method leads to the full utilisation of the available capacity for day-ahead trade. 
However, it is not yet possible to fulfil any requirements to trade intraday across borders. 
 
The first results of day-ahead market coupling are now known. Between 22 November 2006 and 31 January 
2007, prices on the APX, Belpex and Powernext were the same for 65% of the time. More specifically, 
electricity prices in the Netherlands and Belgium were identical for 81% of the time.
37 This means that for 
19% of the time there was congestion as a result of full utilisation, comparable to the situation in 2006 
before market coupling.  
 
As a result of the laying of the NorNed cable, which is expected to enter service at the end of 2007, there will 
be additional cross-border physical import capacity (700 MW). The entire capacity of this connection 
between the Netherlands and Norway is intended to connect the APX to the Nord Pool Scandinavian 
electricity exchange. However, it is uncertain whether market coupling will be able to start when the NorNed 
cable is completed. The possible laying of the BritNed cable will also contribute to the further expansion of 
physical import capacity (approximately 1,000 MW). The plans provide for the cable to enter service at the 
end of 2010. The capacity on this cable will be auctioned partly implicitly (APX in both the Netherlands and 
Great Britain) and partly explicitly.  
 
These developments bring the creation of a north-west European market a step closer. Market integration 
leads to more efficient cross-border trade and better utilisation of cross-border capacity. Further action needs 
to be taken to make this market a reality. Market coupling with Germany is currently under consideration. The 
Action Plan for the Central Western Region (Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg)
38 
includes the implementation of day-ahead flow-based market coupling as one of the action points. It also 
covers the implementation of cross-border intraday and balancing trade. In particular the possibility of 
trading intraday across borders will lead to better utilisation of existing interconnectors. Other points in the 
Action Plan include harmonisation and improvement of the explicit auctions for the long term, joint 
calculation of cross-border capacity, maximisation of the volume and use of cross-border capacity and a 
regional plan for investments in capacity. It is very important that these action points are implemented to 
allow further market integration.  
 
Price convergence with the neighbouring countries will have a major effect on the competition, because it will 
reduce the scarcity of import capacity. Such price convergence may arise due to investments in new 
production capacity with lower marginal costs (such as coal-fired plants) in the Netherlands. The plans for 
new plants are in place; the question is when and to what extent they will be implemented. An expansion of 
the cross-border transmission capacity may also promote competition to a large extent. Investment 
proposals for the expansion of interconnection capacity will only come to fruition if there is a positive cost-
benefit analysis. With sustained price differences, however, it is likely that substantial benefits can be 
expected. Only after a considerable expansion of the interconnection capacity would there be a relevant 
geographic market that is wider than just the Netherlands (Vision Document: Mergers on the Energy 
 
36 The Belgian electricity exchange Belpex began operating on 21 November 2006 at the same time as the introduction of TLC.  
37 For Belgium and France this percentage is 82%. 
38 Publication date 12 February 2007, drawn up by the five regulators BNetzA, CRE, CREG, ILR and DTe, in co-operation with the national 
grid managers.   49
Markets, NMa, November 2006). Until there is a truly integrated north-west European market, the high 
degree of concentration in the Netherlands will remain a focus of attention. 
 
 
  